Introduction
Several studies argue that there is a potential to cost-effectively reduce energy demand by investing more in energy-efficient technologies or incentivizing behavioral change. The argument is typically supported by bottom-up calculations of negative life-cycle costs for measures to improve energy efficiency. Although the magnitude of the so-called energy efficiency gap may be debated, such a gap can be explained by economic theory. It is well known that markets under certain conditions fail to deliver an economically efficient outcome. Several papers have listed a number of market failures and behavioral anomalies explaining why there likely exists an energy efficiency gap (for reviews see Broberg and Kazukauskas, 2015; Gillingham and Palmer, 2014; Allcott and Greenstone, 2012; Linares and Labandeira, 2010) . The listed failures include institutional structures that cause misaligned incentives among stakeholders in the residential sector. In this paper, we study the role of ownership structures to investigate to what extent the energy performance of multi-dwelling buildings in Sweden is affected by institutional failures in the form of principal-agent problems and deviations from profit maximizing interests.
Split incentives arise from institutional structures where the benefits of certain actions do not accrue to the agent who pays for these actions. Concerning residential energy use, split incentives cause either a usage or an efficiency problem. In Sweden the usage problem is potentially relatively large as heat is usually included in the apartment rent and therefore the tenants have no economic incentives to actively manage their indoor temperature to save energy. To deal with the usage problem and the its economic consequences, landlords must increase the rents and/or invest in better insulation or control equipment to regulate the indoor temperature. The efficiency problem occurs when the landlord decides the level of energy efficiency by controlling appliances and installations in the apartment/building. This causes a problem of misaligned incentives in cases where the tenants are the ones paying the energy bill. Under these conditions, the landlord has incentives to minimize investment costs rather than life-cycle costs (or maximize cost-effectiveness). The outcome of this situation is that the tenants will pay too much for the energy they consume. Of course, well-functioning markets should punish such behavior, but asymmetric information and mistrust creates a dynamic that is expected to result in adverse selection and a "market of lemons" (Akerlof, 1970) . Under such circumstances, the market will supply cheap inefficient buildings with too little insulation and equipped with wasteful appliances. In Sweden, the policy response to the efficiency part of the spilt incentive problem has consisted of the introduction of energy performance standards for new buildings and an energy performance certification system. The objective of the latter is to provide tenants and buyers with trustworthy information.
In this paper, we first present a conceptual framework linking ownership structures to institutional failures and inefficient use of energy in the residential sector. We then empirically compare the energy performance of buildings managed under different ownership structures using data based on energy performance certificates covering the population of multi-dwelling buildings in Sweden. Our ultimate objective is to quantify inefficiencies caused by institutional failures in the residential sector. We hypothesize that the energy performance is higher in buildings where the owner has a clear economic incentive to manage the building in an efficient manner and where the incentives of the property owner and the tenants are aligned. In our study, the average energy performance of cooperative apartment buildings is used as the benchmark with which rental apartments are compared. Cooperative apartments are owner-occupied and, therefore, the incentives of the owner and the tenants are more aligned compared with the case with rental apartments. Members of a cooperative apartments association (COAA) are part-owners of the property with the right to use common areas and an exclusive right to use a specific apartment in the building.
COAAs own approximately 40 percent of the total number of apartments in Sweden.
Many of these apartments were built as rental apartments but have been sold to its tenants over time. From 1991 to 2012, around 180,000 rental apartments were sold to COAAs. About 60 percent of all apartments in Sweden are rental apartments, and 50 percent of these are owned and managed by municipal companies (Statistics Sweden, 2016) . The hypotheses tested in this paper is whether cooperative apartment buildings have better energy performance than private and municipal rental apartment buildings, respectively.
Public ownership of residential buildings causes additional management problems.
First, in contrast to public managers, private owners have property rights and personally benefit from cost reductions from energy savings. Hence, the incentives to accomplish cost-reductions are stronger in the private sector (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994) . Second, compared with private owners, public managers may focus more on potential quality erosions associated with cost savings (Hart et al., 1997 ).
Adjustments of the quality level of services may be more difficult to accomplish for public rental companies which are under the control of a political leadership. The services of public rental companies affect many voters in the form of tenants and employees and, therefore, any dissatisfaction with these services may spill over to the political arena. As an example, if landlords want to avoid dissatisfaction, they will not control the indoor temperature even if doing so would be motivated in the second best context of split incentive problems. Finally, more than 80 percent of the multi-dwelling buildings in Sweden are heated by district heating produced in facilities owned by the municipalities. This means that improvements in energy efficiency have a negative effect on the municipal revenues from energy sales (Lind, 2012) .
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present a conceptual framework to illustrate the impact of split incentives and different ownership structures on energy efficiency. In Section 3, we review previous literature on the split incentive problem. We also briefly review empirical research on the efficiency of private ownership compared with that of public ownership. In Section 4, we highlight some features of the housing market in Sweden and describe our data. In Section 5, we describe our econometric models and present empirical results. In Sections 6 and 7, we conclude the paper with discussions about the results and their policy implications.
Conceptual framework
In order to describe the links between ownership types and energy efficiency, we apply a simple theoretical framework to describe the energy efficiency level of a building managed under different ownership structures. We first assume that the landlord can only improve the energy efficiency of the building by investing in better weatherization, control equipment, or energy-efficient appliances and installations.
The landlord cannot influence the tenant's behavior. Next, we assume that the marginal cost of energy efficiency increases with the energy efficiency level of the building. The higher the energy performance, the more costly it is to incrementally improve the energy efficiency level. Given this setting, the landlord's profit level can be illustrated with a bell-shaped curve as illustrated in Figure 1 . Points B, C, and D represent the profit and energy efficiency levels of a cooperative apartment association, a private rental company, and a public rental company, respectively.
Under this framework, the energy efficiency level from under all three ownership structures to a different degree deviate from point A, which represents the profitmaximizing energy efficiency level.
If the owner of the building is a cooperative apartment association (B), the building is owner-occupied and we therefore assume that the tenants waste less energy. We also assume that all cost-effective measures to deal with the split incentive problem are completed. However, the split incentive problem is difficult to solve completely.
Regardless of owner, heat and hot water are typically subject to average pricing. This incentivizes free-riding behavior, which has a negative impact on the energy performance of the building as a whole. This inefficiency is expected to increase with the size of the cooperative because the tenants who cause extra costs have to pay a smaller share of this cost if they are part of a large cooperative. Also, one could expect the social pressure to act in the interest of the cooperative to be larger in small cooperatives.
In the case of private rental companies (C), the incentives of the owner and the tenants are misaligned and, thus, tenants will waste more energy compared with the case where they are part of a cooperative apartment association. However, we expect private rental companies to be profit seeking and therefore complete all cost-effective measures to deal with the split incentive problem.
Public rental companies (D) may not have profit maximization as their ultimate objective but may instead be profit satisficing. Under profit satisficing, agents settle for a satisfactory outcome rather than the best attainable outcome (Kaufman, 1990) .
Public rental companies may also to some degree be reluctant to invest in energy efficiency improvements regardless of the cost savings, especially if doing so may cause complaints that spill over to the political arena. Politicians may respond to this threat by lowering the expected return from the public rental company. In this context, a public rental company's energy efficiency investments may have lower priority than, for example, improvements in the social environment of the buildings (e.g., accessibility).
Point E represents situations of "overinvestment", where the level of energy efficiency is inefficiently high. For example, rental companies may choose to improve weatherization to compensate for the tenant's inefficient use of energy due to split incentives. A landlord can also end up in E if she wants to signal environmental awareness to improve her public image or reputation of being proenvironmental. For example, environmental signaling could be part of the objective function of a profit-satisficing public company. 
Previous literature
The split incentive problem is widely acknowledged in the energy efficiency literature, but few papers verify its existence and quantify it. There are essentially two types of empirical studies in the literature. The first assesses the potential size of the split incentive problem based on the number of dwellings affected by misaligned incentives. Murtishaw and Sathaye (2006) estimate that as much as 35 percent of residential energy use in the U.S. is potentially affected by split incentive problems.
The second type of studies aims to empirically verify and to some extent quantify the split incentive problem by studying household behavior using survey data. Levinson and Niemann (2004) use survey data on U.S. households and find support for the hypothesis that the indoor temperature is higher in households that do not pay for heating directly. Davis (2012) also uses survey data on U.S. households and finds support for the hypothesis that landlords who do not pay for energy use are less likely to choose energy star rated appliances. (2011) analyze split incentive problems in Canadian multifamily dwellings (semi-detached houses, row houses, and low-rise apartment buildings). They conduct an econometric analysis of survey data from 2003 and conclude that households that do not pay for heat directly tend to keep a higher indoor temperature than others. In old buildings, the difference tends to be as much as 4°C.
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They also find that households that do not pay for heat directly are less prone to turn down the thermostat when being out of the dwelling. Gillingham et al. (2012) use survey data on Californian households to study split incentives related to both insulation of buildings and heating and cooling settings.
The study finds some support for the hypothesis that owners who pay for heating and cooling are more prone to adjust their thermostat setting. The study also finds support for the hypothesis that the presence of wall and attic insulation is more likely in dwellings where the landlord pays for heating. Back-of-the-envelope calculations are presented to assess how relevant it is to address split incentive problems in energy and climate policy. The results of these calculations point at modest energy savings and CO 2 reductions (1 and 2 percent potential reduction of the total use of electricity and gas, respectively). The largest potential lies in addressing the efficiency problem of insufficient insulation levels. Krishnamurthy and Kriström (2015) use survey data on 11 OECD countries (including Sweden) and run binary regression models to study differences between owners and tenants in access to energy efficient appliances, energy efficient light bulbs, thermal insulation, energy efficient windows, heat thermostats, solar power, wind turbines, and ground source heat pumps. That someone have access to a specific equipment means it is present in the person's residence. The authors argue that they do a better job than previous studies addressing agency problems by controlling for whether owners inherited energy efficient appliances or invested in energy efficiency themselves. The results point at a higher owner-renter divide than the one found in
Davis (2012) and Gillingham et al. (2012) : owners are 45 and 51 percent more likely than renters to have access to energy efficient appliances and light bulbs, respectively.
When running the conventional "have access to" model, the marginal effects are 0.12 and 0.05 for energy efficient appliances and light bulbs. These figures are of the same magnitude as those found in previous studies. The study also finds a sizable ownerrenter divide concerning thermal insulation and insulated windows, and also a statistically significant divide for heat thermostats.
It should be noted that it is difficult to generalize results from empirical studies at the national level, as there are important country-and region-specific circumstances. For example, countries may differ in climate, culture, incentive structures, and regulatory framework. In Sweden, the apartment rent typically includes heat and water, but not electricity. Landlords provide an oven, a refrigerator, a freezer, and a laundry room with washing machines and dryers. In other countries, tenants often pay for heating, and the appliances and services (e.g., laundry rooms) the landlord provides may differ. There might also be important differences in the regulatory frameworks for apartment rents. Countries may have direct or indirect rent controls that influence the incentives to invest in energy efficiency. The regulatory framework in Sweden stipulates that rents should be centrally negotiated and based on general user values (e.g., standard and location). Based on the user value principle, comparable apartments should have the same rent. As a result of the regulatory framework and how it has been interpreted and implemented, apartment rents in major cities in Sweden are commonly believed to be well below their market-clearing levels, reducing investments in new rental apartments. However, there is no clear evidence that the framework in Sweden has a negative impact on investments in old buildings, as is commonly believed to be the case when direct rent controls are applied (Boverket, 2014) .
Few studies explicitly explore split incentives and energy efficiency of buildings in Sweden or countries with similar structures in the residential sector. There exist some bottom-up calculations of potentials to increase the energy efficiency in the residential and service sector. The part of the potentials that is related to split incentives has been estimated to 2-2.4 TWh .
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The debate on the relative effectiveness of public and private companies has been widely discussed in the economics literature. One common view is that privatization of public services incentivizes cost reductions due to improved efficiency and quality deterioration (Hart et al., 1997) . Another argument in favor of privatization is based on property rights and corporate management theory (Pommerehne and Frey, 1976; Shleifer, 1998) . According to the property rights argument, a principal in the form of a private owner is likely to have better control over the manager (agent) compared with when the principal is a public company and therefore is less likely to personally benefit from higher profits. A third argument focuses on the role of bureaucratic restrictions that impede cost efficiency in public companies. These restrictions may concern a company's labour policy or capital and debt management. For example, Swedish municipal companies cannot borrow money in the capital market directly but must go through a common municipal company that controls the debts of the municipality as a whole. Many Swedish municipalities and counties cooperate within the framework of an association (Kommuninvest) to improve their loan terms in the capital market. The association keeps track of each member's debts to secure that its own credit rating remains at the highest possible level. This structure adds administrative work to municipal companies and may hold back large-scale investments in some companies as it is the debt of the municipality as a whole that matters for the credit rating. There may be several explanations to the differences in energy use intensity. Our ultimate objective is to find out whether any differences are caused by the split incentive problem or the management practices characterizing each ownership type.
To this end, we need to conduct an analysis where we control for cofounding effects, e.g., size, age, heating, and ventilation systems, and other characteristics of the buildings as well as the average size and income of the households residing in them.
The econometric models we estimate are based on the following expression:
where the energy performance (kWh/m 2 ) is the dependent variable, which is regressed on different types of ownership ( * * ) and other control variables ( . . ). Table 1 presents the variables included in the models (see also Appendix B). As can be seen, most multi-dwelling buildings are heated by district heating and use mechanical ventilation. As the data are for certified units, one observation could correspond to one or more detached buildings or to part of a building. In the latter case, which is rather unusual, it is important to control for the effect of heat waste from other parts of the building. Essentially, it matters whether a unit is located in the middle of or the ends of a building.
It is also important to note that an owner can own several buildings that have been certified on different occasions. As most municipalities have only one public rental company, these companies tend to own relatively many buildings. Only a few private rental companies operate at the national level. According to our data, the largest private company owns 8,489 apartments covered by 324 certificates. The largest public company operates in Stockholm and owns 33,633 apartments covered by 1,097 certificates. In the empirical analysis, we control for the economic size of the owners as we expect that large owners are more likely to manage their buildings more professionally. We control for size effects that are unique to cooperative apartment associations, private persons, and private rental companies by including interaction effects between ownership type and size of the apartment stock of each owner. As mentioned above, we expect average pricing of energy to cause more inefficiency in large cooperatives.
The model also includes the year of certification and a dummy indicating whether the heated area of a certification unit has been estimated rather than metered. In the best of all possible worlds, these factors should not turn out to be significant but may actually be so because of imperfect temperature adjustment based on heating degree days or changing/differing practices over time in the way the energy use or area of the buildings has been measured.
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The model also includes dummies for Sweden's 290 municipalities, which are important for at least two reasons. First, Sweden is a relatively large country with higher heat requirements in the north due to a longer heating season and lower winter temperatures. Accordingly, on average the energy use intensity increases the further north the municipality is located, ceteris paribus. Second, parts of the building code differ across municipalities. The minimum energy performance standards for new buildings are stricter in the south than in the north and municipalities are allowed to adopt even stricter standards regarding energy performance than stipulated in the national building code. As we control for the average temperature at the regional level, we expect the municipality dummies to mainly capture other aspects.
The results
In order to sort out whether type of ownership matters for the energy efficiency of multi-dwelling buildings, we run a number of linear regression models centered on our reference model (Model 1). Most of the models concern sub-samples and are estimated to check the robustness of our main results. The differences between the models are described in Table 2 . As we work with close to population data, we focus on the economic significance of the coefficients rather than their statistical significance. All coefficients in the regression models are associated with a small standard error and, thus, are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. However, regression analysis on population data has no clear statistical interpretation as the coefficients reflect population rather than sample averages. The method applied is in practice a matching procedure where certification (building) units are compared based on differences in specific characteristics. 5 The temperature adjustment is made by certified energy consultants in line with Ordinance 2006:1592. Table 3 presents the results for the building characteristics included in our baseline model. The ownership coefficients are presented separately in Table 4 The results for the municipality dummies, not presented in Table 3 , reveal that buildings in Stockholm on average display relatively high energy use intensity compared with most other municipalities when differences in building characteristics are controlled for. Comparing the results of Model 1 and Model 2 shows that the difference between public owners and others decreases when we control for heating system. This result reflects that heat pumps are less frequently used in buildings owned by public rental companies than in other buildings. Differences in heating systems increase the difference in energy use intensity between cooperative buildings and public rental companies by around 38 percent. The difference between private and public rental companies more than doubles. The results for Model 2 can be interpreted as a longrun potential to improve the energy performance of multi-dwelling buildings.
As a first robustness check, Model 3 only concerns buildings with district heating. Table 4 , show that the differences in energy use intensity between buildings owned by public rental companies and private buildings cannot be explained by the building and household characteristics we control for. As can be seen, buildings owned by private rental companies seem to display noticeably higher energy use intensity than cooperative apartment buildings.
Discussion
In this paper, we have compared the energy use intensity of multi-dwelling buildings managed under different ownership structures. It is important to note that we only study the energy used for heating, hot water, and electrical appliances in common areas. Almost all rental and cooperative apartment contracts in Sweden are for heated apartments. Thus, the costs of energy for heating have to be covered by the apartment rents/fees, which implies that tenants lack incentives to save energy by turning down the indoor temperature or reducing their consumption of hot water. Under ceteris paribus assumptions, we find evidence of inefficient management of both privately and publicly owned residential rental buildings. The inefficiency discussed here is relative to the energy performance of cooperative apartment buildings. We argue that as cooperative apartment buildings are owner occupied, the principal agent problems are mitigated since the benefits from improving the energy efficiency of these buildings go directly back to the tenants in the form of lower monthly fees and higher property values.
On average, we estimate that public rental companies could reduce their energy use by at least 8.2 kWh per m 2 (or 5.3 percent). In total, this annual inefficiency amounts to 0.4 TWh, implying a potential reduction in annual energy costs of approximately SEK 0.4 billion (€ 40 million). If we also consider that the heating system in a long run perspective can be changed and improved, the cost reduction potential increases by around 38 percent. This potential is calculated based on the energy efficiency levels of cooperative apartment buildings. It should be noted that this is by no means the total potential, since the management of cooperative buildings may be inefficient as well. Therefore, the above mentioned estimate of the potential is conservative.
Private rental companies also on average exhibit higher energy use intensity values than co-operative apartment buildings when controlling for differences in building characteristics. The difference is mainly attributed to the split incentive problem and amounts to 7 kWh/m 2 (or 4.5 percent). In total, the inefficiency amounts to approximately 0.2 TWh. For buildings owned by private persons, we find no substantial difference compared with the energy use intensity of cooperative apartment buildings.
It should be pointed out that the results presented are subject to some uncertainty.
The data includes no information about some technical details of the buildings, such as the age of the heating and ventilation systems, the amount of wall and attic insulation, and their shape, height, and exact geographical coordinates. Any systematic differences in the above mentioned factors between different owner types will make our results biased.
Policy recommendations
When designing energy efficiency policies, policy makers have to consider the benefits and costs involved. From a strict economic perspective, only cost-effective measures should be undertaken. We believe that the inefficiency pointed out in this paper can be eliminated cost-effectively as it obviously does not exist in the unregulated part of the residential sector (co-operatives). It has been suggested that in order to accomplish greater savings and effectively get rid of the principal agent problem in the residential sector, individual metering and debiting of heat, water, and electricity use are needed. One problem with this strategy is that installment of such a metering system in the existing building stock has proven to be quite expensive.
Maybe more important, the introduction of individual metering and debiting solves one principal agent problem, but creates another. Landlords who do not pay for the energy used in the buildings lack proper incentives to invest cost-effectively in their buildings. For Sweden, our results suggest that it would be a better idea from an energy efficiency perspective to transform public rental apartments to cooperative apartments. Such a strategy would provide tenants with economic incentives not to waste energy and manage the buildings more effectively, e.g., by installing thermostats to control the energy used for heating.
Inventive informational policy measures may also be effective. It has been proven in several papers that information alluding to social norms significantly reduces energy use (see review in Broberg and Kazukauskas, 2015) . A recent study finds that peercomparisons of water consumption also significantly reduce the use of electricity (Jaime Torres and Carlsson, 2016) . The electricity consumption of Swedish households in apartment buildings is typically individually metered and debited.
Thus, peer comparisons of electricity use might be an effective measure to deal with the split incentive problem as such comparisons may reduce not only the use of electricity but also the use of water and heat.
We discovered several problems with the certification data. First, the way the energy performance indicator is calculated makes the energy labeling influenced by measurement errors. Firstly, according to our results, the energy performance depends on what year the certification was conducted. Secondly, the energy performance certification data lacks information about household characteristics.
Average family size in the buildings has a potentially significant influence on the energy performance indicator. More people in the building means more body heat, but also higher energy consumption for showering. The second effect could be captured by collecting data on the consumption of heated water. Today the certifications lack a standardized method for estimating heated water. Thirdly, the ultimate goal of the certification should be to inform consumers about the energy performance of the building in relation to similar buildings. In that way, consumers are informed about the factors that are subject to asymmetric information, e.g., the weatherization standard and the efficiency of the heating system. The overall impression is that the certifications are based on insufficient data, which in the end means that the energy labeling of buildings may be misleading. For example, the certifications include no information on the headroom of the average apartment in the buildings. This lack of information is a serious problem as the energy labels could affect the market value of multi-dwelling buildings. We strongly recommend that the responsible authority in Sweden improve the directives for the certification system in order to improve the quality of the data and methodologies underlying the energy performance indicator. 
